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2Introduction
The mobility of labour and services across Europe in the wake of EU enlargement has exceeded predictions
and expectations. During the first five years since the 2004 accession of Central and Eastern European
countries (CEE) the UK alone received over 949,000 accession country registrations (Border and
Immigration Agency, 2009). The Nordic countries have also proved to be attractive destinations with over
200,000 work permits issued to CEE citizens for the same period. The accession of new 'low-wage’ CEE
member states to the old 'high-wage' EU has therefore stirred intense debates on the implications for wage
and working conditions, and national labour market regimes (Lillie, 2010; Krings, 2009). Focusing on
Denmark, Norway and the UK, the construction sector stands out as one of the major industries recruiting
CEE migrants, who are often exposed to irregular forms of employment and bad working conditions (Friberg
and Tyldum, 2007; Arnholtz and Andersen, 2008; Fitzgerald, 2006). However, the agency of those involved
in this migration is far from clear. On the one hand, the construction sector has long traditions of inter-
European migration (Baganha and Entzinger, 2004) of which trade unions are fully aware and may even
encourage. As Bruno Koebele (then president of the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers)
said in the early 1990s ‘...for building workers, moving from place to place is nothing new. It is an historical
fact that they always made their migratory rules themselves and organised the way these were supervised’
(quoted in Koebele and Cremers, 1994: 11). Thus in all three countries labour immigration has been driven
by demand factors, and has been welcomed by most of the labour market actors. In Norway and Denmark,
the inflow of CEE workers to the construction industry contributed to sustaining the high level of activity in
this industry, and only displaced local labour to a minor extent (Dølvik and Eldring, 2008). In the UK CEE
workers have helped fill the gaps in the ‘reserve army’ of relatively cheap foreign labour (Balch et al., 2004).
On the other hand though, actors within the construction sector are adopting a more global outlook and
transnational sub-contractor chains have grown and are becoming common place in the sector (Bosch and
Philips 2003). Thus, transnational capital relations constantly threaten to make labour migration a vehicle for
3undermining national regulation (Lillie and Greer, 2007; Lillie, 2010). The latter tendency has been
aggravated by the decline in the market for construction services since 2008, which have increased both
domestic and trans-European competition for both jobs and construction contracts.
While these trends have a transnational character, it seems that trade unions persist in handling the
dilemma between free movement of workers and wage pressure on a national or even local level. Therefore,
this article provides a comparative analysis of the initial construction trade union responses to the arrival of
CEE workers in Denmark, Norway and the UK and it asks if trade unions are dealing with the same
challenges in different ways. One of the key responses of unions is through organising newly arrived
workers. Organizing has been seen as a crucial element in avoiding a situation where the presence of CEE
workers may lead to low-wage competition and social dumping. The article gives a comparative analysis of
three construction sector case studies in Copenhagen, Oslo and the North East of England1. In cataloguing
trade union and migrant engagement we have identified the following three key themes that have
underpinned union responses and that all relate to organising; the interplay between the central and local
levels of unions, the innovation and uniqueness of the strategies that were adopted and to what extent the
strategies were successful.
The three case studies are based on in-depth interviews with union representatives and have been
conducted over the same period of time. They all involve union organising strategies which paid special
attention to Polish workers, who have been by far the largest labour migrant group in each country2. The
trade union officials interviewed are those that commonly represent workers in this sector at both national
and local levels. For all three studies the interviews have been on the subject of organizing strategies and
initiatives. We have also all used extensive secondary union policy and strategy documents that deal with the
recent migration. As the analysis below will show, this has in all cases involved very detailed accounts, as a
common hypothesis of the studies is that the interplay between national and local efforts is vital for
understanding the strategies followed in order to organize CEE workers. Thus an in-depth analysis of the
strategic approach of each union at a local level is important for understanding the relative success of the
different unions in organizing CEE workers.
4Trade unions and immigration: Strategies and dilemmas
Efforts to organize migrant workers do not occur in a vacuum; rather they should be seen as part of an
ongoing struggle as the construction sector becomes ever more global in its approach. Following a period of
growing national flexibility at the level of the firm through for instance the use of subcontracting and self-
employment, restructuring in later years has become focused on the options offered by legal and
transnational approaches. EU liberalization and the migration of low wage labour have become increasingly
important for understanding these approaches and the struggles that unfold. Lillie (2010) argues that this
restructuring of employment relations may occur without national class compromises being directly
challenged. Instead migrant workers can be used in local restructuring efforts just as EU regulation, such as
the Services Directive, may enable employers to ‘...remove specific work spaces, contexts, and categories of
people from the protection they would normally enjoy within sovereign states’ (ibid: 688, 695). This
restructuring is of cause not uncontested. First, the restructuring of employment relations in the construction
industry has gradually turned into a multi-level game making the prediction of outcomes and positions more
complicated. Dølvik and Ødegård (2009) show both successful trade union agency and employer
disagreements at the EU level with regard to the changes made to the Services Directive. Specific EU
interest constellations as well as inter-institutional competition may affect the legal possibilities offered to
employers in their search for increased flexibility. Second, studying the EU liberalization of services, Menz
(2005) has emphasised the significance of national regulation and the importance of national varieties of
capitalism in mediating European liberalisation policies. He argues that employer organisations may not
always choose a liberalising path, but may choose instead to defend national institutions. Such variations in
national regulation can also be seen with regard to labour migration after the EU enlargement. However,
Lillie and Greer (2007), in a transnational study of construction, argue that national interests are becoming
increasingly fragmented as ‘...capital abandons national institutions, in reality if not always in rhetoric, labor
unions are increasingly left to their own devices’ (ibid. 553). At the same time Cremers (2010) argues, that
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supranational law and to a hierarchy based on the primacy of the free provision of service’ (ibid. 305). Thus,
the opportunity for national labour market regulation is receding whilst opportunities to use EU labour
market regulation grow. Here the agency of local trade unions, their members and indeed migrant workers
becomes ever more significant through the establishment of worker solidarity at the local level where unions
may effectively challenge employers’ restructuring efforts.
However, establishing transnational worker solidarity is not an easy task just as labour migration is a
problematic issue for trade unions. Historically trade unions have had two objectives. First, there is the
promotion of worker solidarity both within and across national boundaries, and secondly the limitation and
regulation of the market power of employers. While initially complementary, these two dimensions are
potentially bought into conflict by the presence of migrant workers. Labour migrants, particularly in a
transient sector like construction, may often be willing to accept what is traditionally perceived as low status
job in a host country, due to a main focus on earnings during a short term stay. At the same time they may
have lower wage expectations, due to differences in wage levels between countries (Menz, 2005). Thus
migrants may be viewed by employers as more flexible than host-country workers (Piore, 1979). Further, the
increase in the labour supply caused by immigration will strengthen an employer’s position in the labour
market. Last as argued employers may use migrant workers in attempts to restructure employment relations
in a sector. All in all, the presence of migrant workers can serve to weaken the bargaining position of trade
unions and their members in the receiving countries. Thus it has been argued that trade unions have often
been sceptical of labour migration: ‘If employers have a long-standing reputation for preferring immigrants
over native-born workers, then the reverse is equally true of trade unions’ (McGovern, 2007: 228).
Nonetheless, as has been argued it is at the same time crucial for trade unions to organize the migrant
workers in order to avoid these negative effects.
In light of the discussion above, Kahmann (2006) argues that trade unions have three possible
response strategies available to them in the face of migration: First, unions may seek to exert pressure on
governments to regulate the labour market in a way that prevents wage levels and working conditions from
being undermined by the presence of migrant workers. Second, they may target employers to establish
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local restructuring. Third, trade unions may attempt to unionise migrant workers to enable them to demand
better pay and working conditions through joint action. In relation to the latter strategy, which is the main
focus of this article, Penninx and Roosblad (2000) also identify three main dilemmas which unions face with
regard to immigration. First, they ask if trade unions should oppose or cooperate with the employers’ desire
to recruit migrants. If they choose to cooperate, what demands should they formulate with regard to the
conditions offered to these migrants. Second, to understand the extent of inclusion they ask if migrants
should be included as regular members of the union, or should have separate forms of affiliation that exclude
them from full membership. Third, if they are to be fully included should special measures be taken with
regard to any particular needs that they might have?
These dilemmas seem very relevant in understanding the recruitment of CEE workers, although,
clearly one should not ignore factors of so called ‘passive recruitment’ (Kelly and Heery 1989). Passive
recruitment can be said to relay on structural factors such as state of the market, shifts in the labour market
and specific labour market institutions as the generator of union members (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999).
However, we assume that these have had little effect on the recruitment of CEE workers. Regarding the state
of the market, there have been economic booms in all three countries up until mid-2008, followed by slumps
in all three countries. So differences in recruitment would be hard to explain this way. Clearly specific labour
market institutions (such as the Ghent system in Denmark) have a major effect on the recruitment of native
workers (Checchi and Visser 2005), but they seem to have minor effects on CEE workers as they are less
integrated into the labour market institutions. Thus, the strategic choices of trade unions seem to be crucial.
At the same time it should be noted that the literature on union revitalisation stresses that choices of
recruitment strategies are not just formal decisions made once and for all, but involve internal power
struggles and gradual change (Kelly and Heery 1989, Heery 2005). Therefore we note that questions on local
versus national initiative, traditional approaches versus new target-group specific activities as well as
questions of how to measure results are all involved in the resolutions to the dilemmas described above.
7Contextualised comparison and industrial relations in construction
The basic assumption of our methodological design is that the EU-enlargement and the large number of
labour migrants from the accession countries have challenged trade unions in the three countries in a similar
way. In that sense we agree with Krings (2009: 51), that the cross-national study of trade unions and
migration can be very fruitful, although they have been the exception. However, cross-national comparison
does have its draw backs. First, the migration of workers after the EU enlargement has had profoundly
different effects in different sectors. This is due both to the difference in the number of migrants entering
each sector and to the effect these migrants may have for the employment relations in those sectors (which
might be connected). Therefore we have chosen to focus on the construction sector, which has received a
large number of migrant workers and for which the inflow of migrant workers may (as described above)
have significant effects on employment relations. Second, national comparison will often focus on federal
policies and fail to highlight the day to day practices of local unions, which are vital for the actual success of
organizing campaigns. Therefore, we have gone one step deeper than the national level, focusing on local
activities and the interplay between national and local initiatives. The latter of cause raises issues regarding
the units of comparison, which we would describe as local activities nestled within national settings. We thus
follow Locke and Thelen (1995) in arguing for a contextualised comparison of local trade union activities,
rather than trying to present our analysis as a multi-variable analysis involving different levels. Thus, it is
important to not only underline the communalities of the challenges and dilemmas trade unions face, but also
the differences between the national settings that they are embedded in. In the section above we emphasised
some of the challenges unions face in the construction sector in general and in the face of labour migration in
particular. In the following we will take a closer look at the similarities and differences in the industrial
relations which characterise the construction sectors of the three countries.
There are of course significant national dissimilarities between the three countries in terms of the
labour market and industrial relations both in general and specifically in the construction sector. First, the
structure of the trade unions active in the construction sectors are different; one large union (Fellesforbundet)
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are active in the Danish construction industry, whilst in the UK there is one industry union (Ucatt) and two
general unions (GMB and Unite). Secondly, there are significant differences in both unionisation rates -
Denmark (88%), Norway (39%) and the UK (15%) – and in collective agreement coverage - Denmark
(74%), Norway (60%) and the UK (17%) - in the sector (Mercer and Notley, 2008; Nergaard and Stokke,
2010). Thirdly, whilst flexibility through sub-contracting and self-employment is not new in any of the
countries there are differences in the way these contractual forms are used in each country. For example in
the UK Clarke (2006) argues that employment is now fragmented, causal and insecure and the industry is
increasingly based on contingent forms of employment (Forde et al., 2009). Allied to this are workers who
are undocumented or bogus self-employed (Gribling and Clarke, 2006; Harvey and Behling, 2008). This
makes it increasingly difficult for unions trying to enforce agreements on sites. In that sense UK construction
unions have more experience of dealing with this difficult and multifaceted situation than the two Nordic
countries, which only more recently have started to experience these challenges. Fourth, there are significant
differences between the countries with regard to the legal opportunities and practices related to using
industrial conflicts as a means of forcing employers into signing collective agreements. Whilst Norwegian
unions are in a far better position than their UK counterparts, they are limited in their actions compared to
their Danish colleagues. Where Danish unions are faced with a foreseeable fine for actions found unlawful,
Norwegian unions are faced with the treat (similar to that found in the UK) of having to compensate the
affected companies for losses caused by such actions. Although, Norwegian unions can take industrial action
without having members in the targeted firm, this very seldom takes place, unlike in Denmark (Stokke and
Thörnqvist, 2001).
Despite these marked differences there are also many similarities between the Danish and
Norwegian labour markets. Both countries have relatively small and open economies, with well-developed
social welfare systems. Similarities are found not only in the general social structure, but to a certain extent
also in provisions for regulation of the labour market in the two countries. Minimum wage levels have
traditionally been based on collective bargaining in both countries, and have been binding only for workers
who are covered by a collective agreement. Although the collective agreement coverage is lower in Norway,
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signed them (Stokke et al., 2003). In contrast, the UK is a far larger economy and following decades of
continuing neo-liberal restructuring has a receding social welfare system, with creeping full and quasi
privatisation. Although it does have a national minimum wage, its social ‘safety net’ is ever more shaped by
the low common standards of EU directives. However, wages and conditions in construction are mainly
based on collective bargaining and there are a range of national and sub-sector collective agreements
(NECC, 2005), including the Construction Industry Joint Council Working Rule Agreement (WRA). As with
the Scandinavian countries, these agreements often establish the norm even in enterprises that have not
signed them. For example, the dominant Construction Confederation employers association encourage their
main contractor members to follow agreements. As in Norway and Denmark, the collective agreements
cover not only minimum wage levels but also a range of other additional payments. In all three countries
local rates of pay are often above the agreement rates making the minimum wage rates (or lack thereof) of
little importance to wage levels. However, the recruitment of CEE migrants facilitated by EU regulation and
who may initially be willing to work on conditions that are far inferior to what is common, has caused
fragmentation in bargaining arrangements. Despite clear national differences between the two Nordic
countries and the UK, at the sector level they are not that dissimilar. And as a consequence comparable
challenges for construction unions are evident in all three countries, making a comparative analysis of union
strategies of great relevance.
Trade union responses to the EU enlargement - targeting government and
employers
Following Kahmann, we will now look shortly at how unions have interacted with government and
employers with regard to the accession of CEE workers to the EU. On a general level Norwegian and Danish
trade unions have followed largely identical strategies, endorsing a transitional regime. Campaigns where
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launched in both countries, highlighting that accession workers where welcome, but that social dumping and
unequal terms where not. The campaigns were successful and despite the different composition of the two
governments involved almost identical transitional regimes were introduced in 2004 (Dølvik and Eldring,
2008). Work permits would only be granted if individual workers could document that wage levels and
working conditions were in accordance with ‘normal’ standards, and that they had full-time jobs. Therefore,
no specific limit was imposed on the number of CEE workers allowed entry. Self-employed and posted
workers were not encompassed by these transitional regimes, and had free entry. In contrast UK unions
supported a strategy of free entry for CEE workers. An example of this is statements made in the Ucatt union
magazine welcoming new migrants and the pledge that Ucatt would work with the TUC (The UK central
union federation) to develop a union organising strategy for migrant workers (Ucatt, 2004). The first main
example of this was the North East project discussed in this article. There was no identifiable conflict
between union strategy here and government policy. Underlying this was a general assumption, shared by
unions, government and employers that only a ‘manageable’ number of workers would come to the UK. In
reality what has occurred is an unprecedented migration, not only in scale but also in scope, impinging on
most areas of the labour market. Salt and Millar (2006) cite it as almost certainly the largest ever single
migration with Poles the largest ever single national group. Thus the hastily arranged Workers Registration
Scheme (WRS), which was put in place to ‘manage’ CEE migration, has turned out to have a number of
short-comings (Anderson et al., 2006; Fitzgerald, 2006). Workers registering to this were meant to be given
information on employment rights and trade union membership, but as in the two Nordic countries the
scheme only applied to those employed, not the self-employed or posted workers. Thus the information from
it is potentially ineffectual for trade union organising.
There have been major variations in the trade unions’ responses and outcomes with regard to how
they have targeted the employers of migrants. In Denmark, the trade unions have used the traditional practice
of regulating wage levels and working conditions by way of collective agreements with both foreign and
Danish enterprises employing CEE workers. This has constituted a demanding task, which has come up
against some limitations. First, comprehensive efforts and a large number of industrial disputes have been
required in order to obtain very few collective agreements. Second, the trade unions have experienced
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problems with the enforcement of agreements once they have been signed (Andersen and Arnholtz, 2008).
These problems have led to discussions of the desirability of systems for making collective agreements
generally applicable, but so far the option has been avoided.
In Norway, on the other hand, the trade unions have changed their strategy when encountering the
low-wage competition from the CEE countries, by resuscitating the long-dormant Act relating to the general
application of wage agreements. The purpose of the Act is to ensure that foreign workers are offered wage
levels and working conditions that are equal to those of Norwegian employees. In the context of EU
enlargement, in particular with regard to posted workers, general application of collective agreements has
been made a key instrument for avoiding unreasonable low-wage competition and distortion of market
competition in general. The nationwide application of parts of the collective agreement for the construction
industry implies that since January 2007 a statutory minimum wage level has been introduced in this industry
(Alsos and Eldring, 2008). However, the general application of collective agreements has for a long time
been regarded as a controversial instrument in Norwegian labour life, among trade unions as well as among
employers’ organisations. Trade unions’ consider two aspects of this practice as especially problematic.
Firstly, even though non-unionized workers in enterprises that have signed a collective agreement will be
covered by the agreement, the opportunity to become part of a collective agreement is still perceived as a
major incentive to join a trade union. A general application of parts of key provisions in the agreement
(making them statutory) could therefore weaken the trade unions’ basis for recruitment and enhance the
problem of ‘free riders’ (Checchi and Lucifora, 2002). Second, there have been concerns that a general
application of the minimum wage provisions in the collective agreements would be unable to prevent the
segmentation between high-paid and low-paid workers (or low-wage competition), because the minimum
wage levels in most cases are set far below the average hourly wages. In spite of these provisos,
Fellesforbundet assess that the general application has been an appropriate means and response to the
comprehensive labour immigration since 2004 (Eldring and Hansen 2009).
In the UK, CEE workers have freely flowed into numerous, mainly low paid, sectors (Border and
Immigration Agency, 2009). Recruitment agencies have gained a dominant position in the provision of
labour, including in construction (Fitzgerald, 2007), evidenced in the fact that approximately forty percent
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(379,600) of WRS CEE workers were registered as working for recruitment agencies (Border and
Immigration Agency, 2009: 12). Therefore, as the UK has a long established system of voluntary national
and local collective agreements and unions, due to shrinking membership, have little or no control over
employer recruitment they have increasing sought to influence government policy (see Fitzgerald and Hardy,
2010 for further discussion). At a sector level the most obvious example of this is their central role in the
adoption of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, which established regulation of recruitment type
agencies in parts of the food processing sector (dominated by migrants). Construction unions are now
seeking to extend these regulations to the construction sector (Ucatt, 2009; Unite, 2009). Lille and Greer
(2007) also identify union lobbying of government for regulation of public workers projects. They highlight
regulation of the Heathrow Airport Terminal 5 project in restricting self-employed labour and maintaining
national collective agreements. In essence unions now seek better and clearer enforcement of current
legislation and more legal regulation in certain sectors such as construction whilst maintaining as best they
can current collective agreements.
Organising migrant workers in construction: The evidence
In the following we discuss how unions in Copenhagen (Denmark), Oslo (Norway) and the North-East of
England (UK) responded to the inflow of CEE workers into the construction sector in the aftermath of EU
enlargement. Table 1 gives an indication of how our case study unions fit into the discussion above of trade
union engagement with government and employers and the nature of these national approaches.
TABLE 1 IN ABOUT HERE
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From the above we argue that to understand the strategies and engagement of our case study unions
with CEE workers three key themes must be considered. Firstly, we focus on the interplay between the
central and local levels of these unions and how strategies were formulated and then implemented. Secondly,
we look more specifically into the innovation and uniqueness of the strategies that were adopted. Finally, we
discuss to what extent the strategies were successful in terms of membership gain amongst CCE workers.
The formulation of CEE strategies: How approaches were developed
In Denmark, three trade unions have organized CEE workers in the construction industry. First and foremost
Fælles Fagligt Forbund (3F), which similar to Fellesforbundet in Norway, organizes workers in many of the
industries that employ CEE workers (agriculture, construction, manufacturing, hotels and catering). The
other two are more specific to construction: Træ-Industri-Byg (TIB), which organizes carpenters, joiners, etc.
and Malernes Fagforening, which organizes painters3. Prior to EU enlargement, construction unions had
been mainly concerned with maintaining their own rates and the boundaries of union representation. This has
gradually changed during the period after the enlargement. The first clear indication of this change was a
strategy document published in late 2006 by Bygge- Anlægs- og Trækartellet (BAT), which coordinates and
represents the interests and activities of all eight trade unions in the Danish construction sector. This strategy
document argued that more emphasis should be put on considering CEE migrant workers as potential union
members rather than adversaries to be excluded. The next official step was the innovative measure of a joint,
cross-union standard collective agreement for foreign enterprises to ensure that all employers are covered by
the same collective rates. At the same time a tacit consensus grew that it is more important to get CEE
workers organized than who organized them.
Interestingly, these initiatives at the central level where only an official indicator of developments
that had been going on at the local level for some time. Local construction unions had for a while co-
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operated on activities aimed at organizing CEE workers and having them formally covered by collective
agreements. The two things were seen as closely connected, but with an emphasis on coverage. What local
unions needed was the official establishment of a cross-union collective agreement for foreign enterprises,
which would facilitate ongoing cooperation. BAT and the central levels used this local need as a chance to
promote the efforts to organize CEE workers at the local level. In this way, a back-and-forth exchange
between local activist unions and more pragmatic nation officers has been taking place.
The Norwegian construction union Fellesforbundet has actively promoted the unionization of labour
migrants since 2006, following intermittent action by local unions in 2004-2005. Although typically rapid
shifts in labour demand in the sector necessitated frequent cross-border movement of construction workers
within the Nordic region, this did not traditionally involve workers outside of this region. The regional
mobility of workers meant that national unions have not recruited foreign workers, instead formulating
agreements with sister unions in the Nordic countries on cooperation and the validity of collective
agreements. Allied to this new strategy were Fellesforbundet ongoing efforts to eliminate dishonest practices
in the construction industry, including challenging social dumping. Given the latter the change in emphasis
to actively recruiting CEE migrants was presented not as a shift in their previous policy but as a logical
continuation of the union’s previous efforts.
In retrospective, the central level of Fellesforbundet, as well as the local unions in Oslo, have
emphasized that local enthusiasts have strongly contributed to the union’s success in recruiting labour
migrants. The Oslo unions have traditionally been more radical than the central level, and their methods
when engaging with employers in the sector have not always received approval from the leadership in
Fellesforbundet. In light of this at times tense relationship it was significant that the General Secretary in his
address to the 2008 Fellesforbundet’s National Congress warmly thanked the local unions for their efforts in
organising migrants and in combating social dumping. Furthermore, he stated that although there had been
disagreements over the years, he felt a deep respect for local achievements in this area.
In the North East the principle union to organise construction CEE workers was the industry union
Ucatt. Ucatt nationally supported the recruitment of CEE workers and although initiatives were piecemeal
there was as noted a national recognition that a migrant workers strategy should be developed in conjunction
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with the TUC. Significantly, the case study region had little prior engagement with migrant workers and
given this the migrant organising ‘project’ was not initially driven by the union locally but rather initiated
centrally by the TUC. The TUC had centrally encouraged their regional offices to bid for funding to
undertake mapping and exploratory work with newly arrived CEE workers. The Northern TUC, Ucatt and
Northumbria University combined to undertake an initial ‘project’ over a nine month period, with Ucatt
detailing a development office to mainly support this task. Although the project was regarded as generally a
success by both local and national levels of the union as one of the first clear signs of migrant policy
development there were also a number of tensions. The most evident of these began to emerge after the first
six months of the project when increasing pressure was placed on the union locally and in turn on the
development officer to show a recruitment return on CEE engagement. Essentially engagement with the
project had meant that the development officer and other officials were spending an increasing amount of
time visiting sites to engage with Poles and indeed visiting them in the community. Allied to this was also
expenditure on the translation of documents. Overall, if conflict existed between local and national union
structures with regard to organising CEE workers it was here with resource allocation that it was most
evident.
The innovative nature and uniqueness of strategies
In Denmark the local unions in Copenhagen in particular have engaged in a large number of activities,
including cooperation across union boundaries and exchange of information on a regular basis. Overall their
approach has two complementary strands based firstly on the traditional approach of industrial action to
support existing collective agreements, and secondly more innovative initiatives of engagement with CEE
workers in the workplace and community. The first strand involved significant industrial action which
included a large number of blockades and industrial conflicts, undertaken with comprehensive media
coverage in order to prevent employers from using CEE workers to exert a downward pressure on wage
levels. The consequential significant rise in construction industrial action has helped both union legitimacy
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and unity between (Danish) construction workers. The second strand began in early 2006 when the
association of local unions in Copenhagen, Byggefagenes Samvirke, hired a Polish-born officer, to assist
Danish officers on matters related to migrant workers. A Polish club was subsequently established by local
unions in which meetings and various social activities now take place. Inspired by these local initiatives
national federations provided funding to employ another five Polish-speaking ‘consultants’ whose central
aim was to assist local unions all over the country. Following this, funds have been raised at national level to
support local CEE worker organizing initiatives. Local unions can for instance apply for funds if they want
to start a Polish club or want to hold information meetings for CCE workers. At the local level all unions in
Copenhagen decided to assist non-unionized CEE workers, which is contrary to normal practice. The
assumption was that this assistance would lead to the unions gaining a good reputation in the ever growing
CEE community and would eventually mean higher membership gain in this group. However, this dual
strand strategy, combining traditional blockade approaches (which might be perceived as aggressive
behaviour by new migrants) and the newer, more clearly inclusive initiatives, has been difficult to balance.
In Norway, the CEE migrant strategy was initiated by local unions in 2004-2005. It was a response
to non-unionized Polish workers coming to local union offices for assistance, leading to discussions within
the unions about whether it was appropriate to assist persons who at the outset were not members (Eldring
and Hansen, 2009). At that time the unions had in place statutes that the union would provide assistance only
to persons who hold a union membership prior to the submission of a plea, a broadly similar policy to the
unions in the other two countries. The statutes were temporarily suspended as it was believed that this would
allow local chapters to gain a foothold in migrant communities. As the union has become well known among
migrants, the central union organization has signalled that the statutes should now be enforced. This has
gained support within the local unions, which have experienced an increased pressure on their resources.
A significant policy decision also adhered to from an early stage by local chapters was that the
unions should not enact any measures or take any action that would cause labour migrants to be expelled
from the country. This principle was emphasized by interviewees as a key to the establishment of trust with
CEE workers. Also significant was that the generally applied collective agreement has become a key
instrument for the efforts to increase unionisation:
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The general application of the agreement means that we can recruit more members. Without the
general application we must demand a collective agreement before we can claim any rights in terms
of wages. When the agreement has been made applicable to all, we can help individual members.
(Representative of Fellesforbundet)
Although the formal decision to apply for an extension was made by LO, with close consultation with the
central level of Fellesforbundet, the local level played a significant role, by actively promoting the issue
within the internal structures of the union.
In the first month of the North East project Ucatt representatives and full time officials were invited
to a CEE workshop at the TUC to dispel a number of potential myths surrounding newly arrived CEE
workers. At this meeting an English speaking Pole was introduced who essentially ‘told his story’ and
reported some of the poor conditions that Polish construction workers in the North East were suffering.
Overall the meeting was unique in providing an important early message to Ucatt activists and members that
the union was supporting and actively seeking to recruit newly arrived Polish workers. It was also used to
encourage local activists to engage with new migrants to provide them with information on the current local
rates. The day-to-day Ucatt organising strategy used was very similar to that used with indigenous workers
as Ucatt recruitment and retention traditionally relies on local knowledge from site agents and others
regarding newly arrived subcontractors; site based lay representatives engaging with newly arrived workers;
the diligence of full-time officials as they move from site to site; good working relationships with main
contractors and local subcontractors; and the national WRA, with the union endeavouring to have a summary
of the WRA in each site canteen. However, the project was considered pioneering in nature and received a
sizeable amount of attention compared to its low scale funding and resourcing. An example of this
innovation was engagement with a TUC seconded Solidarnosc national organiser for a short period, although
this is currently the only cross-border collaboration undertaken. The development officer also spent time in
the Polish community visiting people’s homes to discuss the union and WRA rates. Overall the uniqueness
of the project was that it was the first time that the union locally had engaged with migrant workers and
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particular initiatives undertaken as part of the project, such as the link with Solidarnosc were certainly
innovative in their nature.
Membership gain: The final judgement of success or failure of engagement?
Whilst the previous analysis has identified significant trade union engagement with CEE workers, there is
always a tension within all membership organisations with regard to the actual numbers of those who join the
organisation. In essence, resources spent on organizing must in the long run amount to increasing
membership gain. Therefore there comes a time with all projects or new engagements that a central criterion
of success is how many new members have been gained. Although issues of social dumping extend this
timeline, most of the above mentioned initiatives and projects have had a clear aim of gaining new members
amongst migrant workers. Financial support was evident in three main ways, firstly through the actual
money spent on projects, secondly via official union human resource and lastly by more informal in-kind
support at a local level. Given this commitment of resources to projects and initiatives, it is surprising to
report that in Denmark and the UK the majority of trade unions involved in our projects did not directly
identify ethnicity when actually recruiting new members, instead estimating numbers of CEE workers
recruited. Whilst in Norway the numbers of Poles joining the union was initially obtained through
identifying the sum of those members whose surname was Polish, again not a wholly accurate approach4.
Overall, in all countries membership gain was mainly based on estimates of what was reported by local
officials working with CEE workers (Denmark and UK), the limited or more concrete evidence provided by
administrators in union offices who process membership (Norway) or an increase identified in the fees being
received from a particular employer of CEE workers (Denmark and to some extent the UK).
Having said this, though, the numbers of CEE members were estimated by all unions and
judgements on the success of projects were made. For example in Norway in the autumn of 2006, it was
believed that Poles accounted for a total of nine per cent of the membership of the two local construction
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workers’ unions in Oslo (Oslo Bygningsarbeiderforening and Tømrer og Byggfagforeningen). By 2008 these
unions, using membership language data, identified the number of Polish members had increased
considerably, with a total of 40 percent of members coming from the accession states, with a majority from
Poland. At the national level, Fellesforbundet in the spring of 2008 estimated that they had between 4,000-
5,000 Polish members, mostly in construction. This constitutes 18-23 % of the total membership in the
construction industry. However, the majority of CEE construction workers remained non-unionized, and they
still have a lower rate of unionization than the Norwegian average (Eldring, 2007). Importantly, though, the
local unions reported that Polish members have gradually become more involved in regular union activities,
being members of union branch committees, taking on positions as union reps etc. In Denmark at the end of
September 2008 it was estimated that the three local unions in Copenhagen had a total of 300 CEE members
combined, which amounts to approximately three percent of the total membership in construction. There was
no estimation of the actual numbers of CEE or Polish members recruited in the UK; the general opinion was
that the project had provided a successful example of migrant engagement, but not of initial membership
gain.
It is believed on the evidence of our studies that the Norwegian unions have enjoyed a greater degree
of success in their attempts to unionise CEE workers than their Danish and UK counterparts. What can be
reported is that in Norway most of the unionised Polish workers are regular members, paying their union
dues in the standard electronic manner mainly through their employers. In contrast, a central barrier to
membership gain in both Denmark and the UK was the actual electronic process of payment, which was a
significant issue for CEE workers. For example, in the UK this means of paying membership dues was not
possible mainly because Polish workers were initially unable to open bank accounts. In both countries this
compounded barriers to organising those transitory Polish workers who moved after a short period.
Furthermore, a survey amongst Polish workers in the Copenhagen area showed that a large number of
respondents had never had any contact with the Danish trade unions (Arnholtz & Hansen 2009).
Discussion and conclusions
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The evidence of our studies show that the Norwegian construction workers’ union have been more successful
in unionising CEE workers than their Danish and UK counterparts. This is an interesting finding given that
the Danes normally have a higher organization rate and given that they have put a lot of resources into
engaging Polish workers while it is less surprising that the weaker UK unions have not achieved similar
results.
In reflecting on this difference one could consider differences in the point of view of CEE workers.
However, there is no evidence to suggest that Poles coming to Norway should be more positively inclined
towards unions than those coming to Denmark or UK. Rather evidence suggests the opposite. For example a
survey among Polish workers in Oslo indicated that their ideology or normative attitudes towards union
membership would induce them to join, rather than the opposite (Eldring, 2007). This conclusion is
consistent with findings in a similar survey conducted in Copenhagen (Arnholtz & Hansen 2009) as well as
the finding from our UK construction case study (Fitzgerald, 2006) and a national UK TUC study of CEE
workers. In this national TUC study CEE workers when asked why they would choose to join a union,
indicated the need for a ‘sword of justice’ and collectivist values, rather than more individually oriented
‘service’ and self-interest needs (Anderson et al. 2007). Thus union strategies are of vital importance in
understanding our studies.
Implicit in our discussion of the three main themes above is that our case study unions have all been
inclusive in their organising strategies and made an important contribution to integrating migrants. However,
as Penninx and Roosblad (2000) identify each union has been faced with crucial dilemmas when it came to
the means and extent of inclusion with CEE workers often used by employers as low-wage alternatives.
Thus, there were differing tensions with regard to this question and of the effort that was put into organising
CEE workers and opposing social dumping. In Denmark the stronger union framework meant that a delicate
balance existed between the traditional blockade strategy and newer more organising based approach. This
balance has been hard to strike, as Danish unions typically rely on ‘passive recruitment’ factors such as the
Ghent system. Whilst the weaker unions, such as Ucatt in the UK had difficulty in providing the required
resources for the longer period that a migrant organising approach may take. A further, as yet unexplored,
issue in our unions is that efforts to integrate migrant workers may initiate a revival of a more activist
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approach at the expense of official union officers. Thus, classic questions arise regarding resource allocation
for organising and power struggles between fractions within unions (Kelly and Heery, 1989). Unions may
also seek new allies among the new actors of industrial relations (Heery and Frege, 2006), which Ucatt have
begun to do in the UK (Fitzgerald, 2009). This though will again challenge the boundaries of a union and
indeed its focus on who are its potential members. At the same time, external constraints are put on union
activities; channels of migration and migrant employment status (posted, self-employed or directly
employed) affect a unions opportunity to both organise and help migrant workers (Andersen & Arnholtz,
2008). More generally the employers’ relation to the national system of industrial relations may affect their
willingness to cooperate with unions on this issue of organisation, and thus affect union response strategies
to migrant workers (McGovern, 2007).
So whilst our case study unions have accepted the recruitment of CEE workers in Denmark and
Norway this acceptance has been made subject to the condition that the workers should be employed on
equal terms with host workers. These requirements regarding labour conditions have been promoted in
relation to government as well as employers in both countries, even though some differences remain with
regard to the specific regulation of wage levels and working conditions. In the UK, the trade unions’
influence with regard to equal conditions is more limited. Ucatt and the other construction unions are
restrained by a lack of membership and the large number of very small building contractors present on sites.
With regard to Penninx and Roosblad (2000) CEE workers have been included as regular members in all the
three countries; however there are issues over the sustainability of membership due to the transient nature of
construction work and employment relations.
On the other hand, there have been major variations in the trade unions’ responses and outcomes
with regard to the other set of strategies described by Kahmann, concerning responses that target employers.
At the same time it is worth noting that the practical recruitment efforts mainly have taken place locally, and
focus should therefore be put on the activities of the local unions in order to gain an understanding of the
actual strategies that have been followed. Locally based initiatives have undoubtedly had a large effect on the
success in recruiting CEE workers. In all the three cases we find many examples of enthusiastic local activist
and local unions. Their recruitment efforts have made a strong impact, and have often been portrayed as
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activities of an exemplary character by the media5. Without these enthusiasts, the nationwide drive to
increase unionisation would most likely not have been as effective. In looking at the interplay between
national and local level, it is interesting to note that the clearest ‘bottom-up’ drive for organising efforts have
been found in Norway, which is at the same time where unions have been most successful in organising. It
should therefore be noted that the unions’ approach to the dilemmas outlined by Penninx and Roosblad
should not necessarily be perceived as choices made at a certain point in a formalised process, but rather as a
fact that emerges by way of practical activities that are dependent on institutional and historical
circumstances, and not least on factors that are embedded in a local context.
Comparing Denmark and Norway, one key explanation for how apparently identical frameworks and
purported strategies can result in widely differing outcomes in terms of recruitment of labour immigrants can
probably be found in the institutional dissimilarities in the two countries’ traditions for handling conflict
(Evju, 2008). In the Danish labour market, the legal opportunities to take industrial action are wider, and
historically this has resulted in a far higher number of labour conflicts (Stokke and Thörnqvist, 2001).
Denmark and the UK also have these disparities. Thus, whilst the Danish unions’ efforts to establish
collective agreements may have appeared too aggressive in the eyes of migrant workers, Norwegian and UK
unions’ approach of providing assistance to individuals may more convincingly have appeared as based on
solidarity. The Danish trade unions are larger and more powerful than their sister organisations in Norway
and the UK and appear to a greater degree as monitors and administrators of the industry, rather than as
organisers and activists. This latter role may inspire more confidence in the power and usefulness of the
union, but with time and resources focused on maintaining rules and regulations, labour migrants might not
feel that unions are there for them. In Norway and the UK resources have been used on local recruitment,
personal contact and strong engagement with migrants.
This should not lead to overall conclusions regarding the successful handling of the challenges
unions are facing in the light of accession migration, as these challenges involve a number of issues. As
Locke and Thelen (1995) note, common challenges may have been translated into specific conflicts in the
various national settings making the organisation of migrant workers more important in some countries than
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others. Thus overall this comparative analysis highlights, that all three strategic areas described by Kahmann
should be considered in an explanation of the differing outcomes of union activities. Some research on trade
union recruitment has focused on what Kahmann would refer to as the autonomous activities of unions (see
Heery et al., 2000 and 2003). While our investigations indicate that unions must undertake coherent efforts
along several dimensions in order to be successful in recruiting and including labour immigrants.
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Footnotes
1. The Norwegian study is part of a research programme on labour and service mobility, financed by the Research
Council of Norway.
2. In the article we make no distinction between different groups of Central and Eastern European migrant workers.
3. 3F and TiB have recently merged, but where separate unions at the time of study. The processes surrounding the
migrant workers may have contributed to making the merger possible.
4. In the 2008 an administrative change was made and the language of new members is now recorded which provides
a more solid base for calculations of ethnicity.
5. See for instance Økonomisk Rapport 15.06.2006, Dagens Næringsliv 21.11.2007, Aftenposten 02.09.2008
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Table 1. Trade union responses to EU enlargement
Target group Approach Denmark Norway UK
Government
Employer
CEE workers
Immigration entry Transitional regime Transitional regime Free entry
Collective
agreement
Collective
agreements only
Legal extension of
collective agreements
Voluntary
collective
agreements but
also campaigns
for statutory
support
National level Traditional New New but
pragmatic
Case study
CEE workers
Strategy formation National and local
interaction
Bottom up pressure Top-down
pressure
Innovation extent New initiatives but
mainly based on
traditional approach
New initiatives New initiatives
but based on
traditional
approach
Membership gain Low Moderate/high Low
